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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR ARCHITECTURAL
DESIGN: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL CRITICISM
Gregory B. Hancks*
Abstract: The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 (AWCPA) extended
copyright protection to architectural design as part of Congress's effort to conform U.S. law to
the Berne Convention. U.S. courts previously had treated architecture as a "useful article" and
generally had denied it protection under the "separability" doctrine. The AWCPA treats
architecture similarly to other categories of copyrightable subject matter. Conceptually, this is
inappropriate because (I) architectural design is a professional service, (2) architecture is a
part of our public environment, and (3) architecture's expressive aspects cannot be adequately
separated from its useful aspects. As a practical matter, the AWCPA imposes costs on
architects that outweigh the benefits that it confers on them. To help alleviate this result, the
AWCPA should be amended to limit protection to designs with artistic or aesthetic
expression. Nevertheless, architects working under the AWCPA should alter their
relationships with their employees, consultants, and clients to minimize liability for
infringement.

United States copyright law did not protect architectural design prior
to 1990.' Any or all of a building's features could be copied, whether
observed in drawings, photographs, or the structure itself.2 Copyright law
limited this borrowing in only two ways. The reproduction of
architectural drawings themselves was prohibited,3 and a sculptural

* The student author wishes to acknowledge that he is a registered architect and a member of the
American Institute of Architects.
I. Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (W.D. Va. 1994),
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995). A built structure, a
drawing of that structure, and the design that is embodied in the structure or drawing are all types of
created work that the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to protect as the "writing" of an
"author." See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1972) (citing U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Until 1990, Congress had chosen to protect architectural drawings, but not
architectural structures or architectural design. Richmond Homes, 862 F. Supp. at 1524-25.
Therefore, analysis of architectural copyright must begin by distinguishing among these types of
created works. See infra text accompanying notes 25-32. The copyright statute itself refers to
"design," "building," and "drawings" within its definition of an "architectural work," describing
"design" as "the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See also Christopher Alexander, Notes on the Synthesis of Form 1 (1964)
(describing "design" as "inventing physical things which display new physical order, organization,
[and] form, in response to function").
2. The work might have been protected under patent law, federal unfair competition law, or state
law, however. See U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright in Works of Architecture: A Report of the
Register of Copyrights63-69 (1989) [hereinafter Copyright Office Report].
3. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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feature of a building could not be copied if that feature could be
considered a work of art independent of the building's useful nature.4
In the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act' of 1990
(AWCPA), Congress extended copyright to architectural design by
adding "architectural works" as a category of protected subject matter.6
Many legal commentators had argued for such a step.7 Few architects had
joined in requesting this additional legal control over their work,
however.'
This Comment describes why the AWCPA is an inimical intrusion
into the architectural design process. Part I summarizes copyright law's
treatment of architecture from the historical exclusion of architectural
works as "useful articles" to the enactment of the AWCPA. Part II
provides a conceptual framework for understanding architectural design
as a professional service and as a part of our public environmentcharacteristics which copyright law does not adequately take into
account. Part II also describes why traditional copyright doctrine cannot
resolve the problems inherent in protecting the design of useful articles
such as architecture. Part III outlines the practical problems that the
AWCPA creates and predicts how courts, architects, and others involved
in the design and construction process will react. The Comment
concludes that architects should alter their professional relationships to
minimize their liability and that the AWCPA should be amended to
protect only designs with artistic or aesthetic expression.

4. See infra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
5. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102, 106, 120,
301 (1994)).
6. § 703, 104 Stat. at 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994)).
7. See, e.g., Natalie Wargo, Note, Copyright Protection for Architecture and the Berne
Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 403, 478 (1990); Erika White, Comment, Standing on Shaky
Ground: Copyright Protectionfor Works of Architecture, 6 Art & L. 70, 74 (1981); cf David E.
Shipley, Copyright Protectionfor Architectural Works, 37 S.C. L. Rev. 393, 448-49 (1986) (arguing
for broader judicial interpretation of existing statute to protect architectural design). But see James B.
Bucher, Comment, Reinforcing the Foundation: The Case Against Copyright Protectionfor Works
ofArchitecture, 39 Emory L.J. 1261, 1292 (1990).
8. Copyright Office Report, supranote 2, at 195-96.

Copyright Protection for Architectural Design
I.

HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF ARCHITECTURE IN U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW

A.

Architectural CopyrightPriorto the A WCPA

In the Copyright Act of 19099 ("1909 Act"), Congress protected "all
the writings of an author""0 upon publication if a notice of copyright was
affixed to each copy." The 1909 Act did not further limit the subject
matter that was protectable but did provide a list of registration
classifications, which included "works of art" and "designs for works of
art.'
Sculpture clearly could be copyrighted as a work of art.
Monumental architecture, which is essentially large-scale sculpture,
could be copyrighted for the same reason. 3
When confronted with copyright claims on utilitarian designs with
expressive 4 features, courts concluded that only a feature which could
"'be identified separately' and was "'capable of existing independently
as a work of art"' could be copyrighted. 5 This "separability" doctrine
effectively excluded most architectural design from copyright protection
under the 1909 Act because nearly all such design is useful. In the
Copyright Act of 197616 ("1976 Act"), Congress retained the restriction
on copyright for useful articles 7 and explicitly adopted the court-created
9. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2541 (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
10. § 4,35 Stat. at 1076 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1976)) (repealed effective 1978).
11. § 9, 35 Stat. at 1077 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1976)) (repealed effective 1978).
12. § 5(g), 35 Stat. at 1076-77 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(g) (1976)) (repealed effective 1978).
13. Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(noting as examples the Statue of Liberty and the Eiffel Tower), aff'd in part, rev'd in parton other
grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995).
14. Courts sometimes use the term "aesthetic" rather than "expressive" when describing
protectable features. See, e.g., Carol Bamhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d
Cir. 1985). The copyright statute protects "expression," 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994), which connotes the
designer's intent, rather than the observer's response.
15. CarolBarnhart,773 F.2d at 416 (quoting Copyright Office regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c)
(1959)) (emphasis added).
16. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5667-68 [hereinafter 1976 H.R. Rep.] (explaining that works of "applied art," which are pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles, are protectable, but industrial designs are
not); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "useful article" as "an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function" other than to create an appearance or to convey information); Carol Barnhart,
773 F.2d at 418-19 (holding that mannequins for clothing display are uncopyrightable useful
articles).
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doctrine used to define what is copyrightable: 8 "[T]he design of a useful
article" cannot be copyrighted unless it incorporates "pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are
capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article.' 9
The House Report on the 1976 Act explained tht this separate
identification may be either physical or conceptual.2" The test of physical
separability is easy to apply to a building's ornamental feature that could
be removed and used as free-standing sculpture. Applying the conceptual
separability test to architectural design is considerably more problematic.
It requires the separation of expression from utility. This task must be
accomplished in the face of the design trend of the past century which
has created expression primarily through the satisfaction of function,
rather than by application of ornament.2 The 1976 Act, therefore,
effectively precluded copyright in a built structure itself or in its design.'
Architectural design might have found practical copyright protection
under either the 1909 Act or the 1976 Act, however, were it not for the
court-created distinction between the publication of a work which
describes a useful art (such as accounting, medicine, or farming) and the
use of the art described.23 The U.S. Supreme Court had set forth this
standard in Baker v. Selden.24 Prior to the AWCPA, Baker guided courts
in distinguishing the copyright in an architectural drawing from rights in
the design depicted by that drawing.2 As a result, an arch:.tect could have
a copyright in the drawings of a building without having a right to

18. 1976 H.R. Rep., supra note 17, at 54-55, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667-68.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works") (emphasis
added).
20. 1976H.R. Rep., supra note 17, at 55, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 112-27. See generally Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Jr. &
Philip Johnson, The InternationalStyle: ArchitectureSince 1922 (1932).
22. See 1976 H.R. Rep., supra note 17, at 55, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668.
23. See, e.g., Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamcnt, 458 F.2d 895, 898-99 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying
the 1909 Act).
24. 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (holding that book's copyright did not restrict use of bookkeeping
method explained in book).
25. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274,278-81 (6th Cir. 1988);
Imperial Homes, 458 F.2d at 898-99; Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 663-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).

Copyright Protection for Architectural Design
control the use of the design itself.26 Thus, the architect could not prevent
someone else from constructing a building of the same design.27
Courts relied on this distinction when applying both the 1909 Act and
the 1976 Act to architecture, analyzing rights in a drawing separately
from rights in the design.25 The 1909 Act, in fact, listed "technical"
drawings as works which could obtain copyright registration.29
Consequently, architectural drawings generally were protected against
reproduction in the form of copied drawings.3"
Under the 1909 Act, courts could have held that the construction of a
building from copyrighted drawings is copying in a different medium.
This would have given the copyright owner the "right of execution."'"
Instead, a consensus developed, relying on Baker v. Selden, that such
construction was a use of the "useful art" depicted by the drawings.32 As
a result, an architectural design embodied in either drawings or in a built
structure could not be protected from copying unless the design itself
was copyrightable subject matter.
B.

Compliance with the Berne Convention and Enactment of the
A WCPA

The exclusion of architectural design from copyright protection by the
1976 Act was bound to create tension with a primary purpose of the act:
to move U.S. copyright law toward conformity with the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ("Berne
Convention" or "Berne").33 The United States had wanted to join Berne
26. Demetriades,680 F. Supp. at 664.
27. Architects have argued that the exclusive right to this use of an architectural design, which
this Comment refers to as the "right of execution," should have been part of the copyright in
architectural drawings. See infra notes 51, 61 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Robert R. Jones Assocs., 858 F.2d at 278-81; Imperial Homes, 458 F.2d at 898-99;
Demetriades,680 F. Supp. at 663-66.
29. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(i), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(i)
(1976)) (repealed effective 1978). "[A]rchitectural plans" were specifically added as an example of
"[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" by the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(l)(A), 102 Stat. 2853,2854 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
30. 1 Melville B. Ninuner& David Nimmer, Nimmeron Copyright § 2.08[D][2][a] (1995).
31. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Robert R. JonesAssocs., 858 F.2d at 278-81; Imperial Homes, 458 F.2d at 898-99;
Demetriades,680 F. Supp. at 663-66.
33. See 1976 H.R. Rep., supra note 17, at 47, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5660 (describing
role of Berne standards in U.S. copyright law revision). "For more than 100 years, the Berne
Convention has been the major multilateral agreement governing international copyright relations"

Washington Law Review

Vol. 71:177, 1996

since at least the 1920s34 but had been prevented by significant conflicts
between U.S. copyright law and Berne standards,35 which are of
primarily European origin.36
Berne has specifically included works of architecture as protected

subject matter since 1908. 37 Berne member countries typically list works
of architecture as a category of protected subject matter in their
implementing legislation.38 There are few reported cases on architectural
copyright in countries adhering to the Berne Convention. Those which
exist, however, demonstrate that the owners of copyright in works of
architecture have been given rights that go substantially beyond what
U.S. law allowed prior to the AWCPA.39

and is "the highest internationally recognized standard for the protection of works of authorship." S.
Rep. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3707
[hereinafter 1988 S. Rep.].
34. Copyright Office Report,supra note 2, at 82.
35. The purpose of U.S. copyright protection is to promote the economic welfare of society by
promoting the progress of science and useflil arts. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). By contrast, European copyright law since the eighteenth century has
focused on the right ofauthors to protect their investment. Sam Ricketson, The .erne Conventionfor
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works: 1886-1986, at 5-8 (1987). See also 1988 S. Rep.,
supra note 33, at 5, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3710.
36. Seven of the eight initial member countries were European. See Ricketson, supra note 35, at
956-58.
37. Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at 144. The inherent right of artists to protection of
their work provided the rationale for protecting works of architecture. See id.; Ricketson, supra note
35, at 254.
38. Of the 81 member countries in 1988, only three did not protect architectural works by statute.
CopyrightOffice Report, supranote 2, at 158.
39. In a leading case in the United Kingdom, a court held that a building was an infringing (threedimensional) reproduction of a (two-dimensional) drawing. Chabot v. Davies, [1936] 3 All E.R. 221
(Ch.). In a later U.K. case, an architect obtained substantial damages against a former client who
constructed a building with an identifiable feature that originated from a schematic drawing prepared
by the architect. Stovin-Bradford v. Volpoint Properties Ltd., [1971] 3 All E.R. 570 (C.A.).
Canadian courts similarly have upheld architects' right of execution. In the leading case, Hay &
Hay Constr. Co. v. Sloan, 27 C.P.R. 132 (Ont. H.C. 1957), the builder of a tract house infringed on
the copyright in another tract house by constructing a copy. In two other reported cases, builders
have been held liable for constructing infringing buildings from drawings that were prepared using
the plaintiff's drawings. Kaffka v. Mountain Side Devs. Ltd., 62 C.P.R. 2d 157 (B.C.S.C. 1982);
Randall Homes Ltd. v. Harwood Homes Ltd., [1987] 4 W.W.R. 705 (Man. Q.B.).
In Germany, as well, copyrighted drawings may be infringed by the construction of a building.
Adolf Dietz, Germany § 2[2], in I InternationalCopyright Law and Practice (Paul E. Geller ed.,
1995).
See also Wargo, supranote 7, at 421-23.
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Congress had given scant attention to adding architecture as protected
subject matter in the 1976 Act, 0 but the issue was analyzed in more
depth when legislation to implement the Berne Convention was
considered in 1986. 4" At that time, Congress expressed concern about the
unknown effects of extending copyright protection to creative works that
are "more appropriate to design or patent protection.' 42 Congress also
was uncertain whether the protection already available for architecture
was sufficient to comply with Berne.43 As a result, the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988' did not add architecture as a category of
protected subject matter. However the uncertainty prompted Rep. Robert
Kastenmeier 4 to request the Copyright Office to study the issue."
The Register of Copyrights, Ralph Oman, issued his report in June
1989"7 after an opportunity for public comment.48 Oman previously had
acknowledged that "'[p]rotection for architectural works would be a
major change in American law."' 49 But the report glossed over objections
raised by the American Institute of Architects (AIA)5 0 which stated that
such a change would do more harm than good: The AIA believed that
such protection would have a chilling effect on progress in architectural
design by discouraging architects from incorporating new stylistic ideas
into their work out of fear of litigation. The report presented four
options without making a recommendation. 2

40. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 2. at 97.
41. Id. at 102-11.
42. H.R. Rep. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988).
43. Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at 101.
44. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
45. Rep. Kastenmeier sponsored the AWCPA and was chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice during consideration of the bill. Architectural
Design Protection: Hearing on H.R. 3990 and H.R. 3991 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1990) [hereinafterAWCPA Hearing].
46. Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at app. A.
47. Id. at vii.
48. Notice of Inquiry, 53 Fed. Reg. 21,536 (1988). Only I1 comments were received. See
Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at app. C.
49. Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at 117 (quoting written remarks of Ralph Oman,
Register of Copyrights, at Senate hearing).
50. The AIA is a professional association with a membership that includes approximately twothirds of all licensed architects practicing in the United States. Id. at app. C, Letter from Christopher
A. Meyer, attorney for AIA, to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights I (Sept. 16, 1988).
51. See id. at xv-xvi, 4, 109-11, 196. The AIA believed that subject matter protection for
architecture was "undesirable" but did support adding a right of execution to copyrighted
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Rep. Kastenmeier read the report to say that U.S. law should be
amended to provide protection expressly for architectural design. 3 He
introduced a bill54 (later enacted in amended form as the AWCPA) which
embraced the broadest option presented in the report: creation of a new
subject matter category for works of architecture. In introducing the bill,
he made clear that its purpose was to comply with the Bern e Convention,
and he asserted that it made the minimum changes necessary to comply."
Rep. Kastenmeier claimed that his bill avoided the controversial
separability doctrine which had previously applied to all useful articles56
but acknowledged that courts would nevertheless need to distinguish
between architecture and "mere construction."57 He proposed a two-step
test to make this determination: "First, an architectural work should be
examined to determine whether there are original, artistic elements
present, including overall shape. If so, a second step is reached to
examine whether the original, artistic elements are functionally required.
If the elements are not absolutely functionally required, the work is
protectable."'5
The House hearing on the bill explored this problem of defining the
scope of protected subject matter."9 At the hearing, the A[A restated the
doubts6" it had expressed in the Copyright Office report about the broad

architectural drawings. Id. at app. C, Letter from Christopher A. Meyer, attorney for AIA, to Ralph
Oman, Register of Copyrights 2, 5 (Sept. 16, 1988). See also infra note 97 and accompanying text.
52. The options were: (1) to protect works of architecture as a new category of protected subject
matter, (2) to provide a right of execution for architectural drawings; (3) to exclude unique
architectural structures from the category of useful articles; and (4) to make no statutory revisions.
Copyright Office Report, supranote 2, at 223-26.
53. 136 Cong. Rec. 1733 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("[T]he Berne Convention
requires protection for works of architecture, and U.S. law should be amended to expressly so
provide.").
54. H.R. 3990, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
55. 136 Cong. Rec. 1733-34 (1990). Rep. Kastenmeier argued against the AIA's proposal to
simply add a right of execution for drawings, saying that granting such a right would lead to
excessively broad protection of useful, but non-architectural, design. Id. at 1734.
56. See supratext accompanying notes 14-19.
57. 136 Cong. Ree. 1733 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
58. Id. at 1734. This test was incorporated into the House Report on the AWCPA with "design"
substituted for "artistic" among other changes. See H.R. Rep. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951-52 [hereinafter 1990 H.R. Rep.]. The Report
also stated, however, that only the "'poetic language"' of building design is interded to be protected.
Id. at 18-19, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6949-50 (quoting hearing tetimony of architect
Michael Graves). This Comment therefore treats the two versions of the test as equivalent.
59. See generally A WCPA Hearing,supranote 45.
60. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
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protection proposed and again requested that only a right of execution be
extended to drawings. 6' The bill nevertheless retained architectural works
as newly protected subject matter, with the House Report reaffirming that
the statute's purpose was to comply with Berne standards.62 The
AWCPA was signed into law and became effective on Dec. 1, 1990.63
By adding protection for architectural design, the AWCPA thus
incorporates into U.S. copyright law a policy which originated in Europe,
which is not supported by the profession it purports to protect, and the
application of which is untested in the United States. This result may be
unavoidable, given the overriding importance of adhering to Berne to
protect other subject matter in international markets.' The scope of what
is now protected is uncertain, however. The AWCPA itself provides little
guidance beyond the mere use of the term "architectural., 6' The statutory
definition of "architectural work," if anything, broadens its meaning by
incorporating the term "building" without qualification.6 The only
express limitation is that "individual standard features" are not
protected.67
Cases brought under the AWCPA will challenge courts to declare
whether particular buildings are or are not works of architecture.6 8 This
61. AIVCPA Hearing, supra note 45, at 118. The AIA offered only nominal support for the
proposed bill, saying that the AIA "accept[ed the] legal determination" that compliance with Berne
required coverage of architectural works. Id. at 110, 114 (statement of David A. Daileda, former AIA
director).
62. 1990 H.R. Rep., supranote 58, at 10, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6941.
63. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 706, 104 Sta. 5089, 5134 (1990).
64. See 1988 S. Rep., supra note 33, at 2-5, reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3707-10.
65. The AWCPA provides that works of authorship include "architectural works." Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 703, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994)).
66. The AWCPA provides:
An "architectural work" is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of
expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall
form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does
not include individual standard features.
§ 702, 104 Stat. at 5133 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
67. See § 702, supra note 66. Regulations on registration provide the Copyright Office's view on
what may be protected as an architectural work. See 37 C.F.R1 § 202 (1995). No limitations on
architecture appear under the heading "Material not subject to copyright." See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1. A
protected "building" does not need to have artistic content. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 l(b)(2). In fact, the
Copyright Office describes methods for registering the design of mass-produced "tract housing." See
37 C.F.R. § 202.1 1(c)(2). However "[s]tandard configurations of spaces" are excluded from
protection. 37 C.F.R. § 202.11 (d)(2).
68. The lag between the enactment of the AWCPA and reported cases can be explained by the fact
that only designs which are created, published, or built after Dec. 1, 1990, are protected. See Pub. L.
No. 101-650, § 706, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134 (1990). An infringement suit would not be commenced
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determination closely resembles the question presented to the U.S.
Supreme Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.69 Writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes declined to distinguish between works of
art and "pictorial illustrations" used for commercial purposes.70
Commentators on the AWCPA have consistently found it necessary to
analyze how a court would distinguish between what is architecture and
what is not,7' and each has returned to Rep. Kastenmeier's proposed twostep test.7 While these commentators' evaluations of the lest range from
uncritical acceptance73 to dismissal as an unhelpful restatement of the
unworkable separability doctrine,74 the test itself may be irrelevant. The
first court to apply the AWCPA to architectural design retd the statutory
definition of architectural work 75 literally and, following in Justice
Holmes's footsteps, made no distinction between architecture and a mere
building.76
II.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW
TO ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN

The AWCPA injects copyright law's narrowly focused values into the
architectural design process. The copyright model was developed to
protect works where the cost of producing a copy :s minimal in

until a subsequent similar design had been built or published. But cases are beginning to appear. See
Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 (W.D Va. 1994), aff'd in
part,rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995); J.R. Lazaro Builders, Inc. v. R.E.
Ripberger Builders, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 336, 339 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
69. 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (holding that advertising illustrations are protectable by copyright).
70. Id. at251-52.
71. See, e.g., Michael E. Scholl, Note, The ArchitecturalWorks Copyright ProtectionAct of 1990:
A Solution or a Hindrance?, 22 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 807, 811-19 (1992)o; Matthew Turner,
Comment, The Architectural Works Copyright ProtectionAct of 1990: The Logical Step in United
States Copyright Law, 41 Kan. L. Rev. 227, 241-43 (1992); Raphael Winick, Note, Copyright
Protectionfor Architecture After the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 41
Duke L.J. 1598, 1612-19 (1992); Carl M. Sapers, Second Thoughts on the 1990 .rchitectural Works
Copyright ProtectionAct, Construction Law., Apr. 1993, at 16, 16.
72. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
73. Turner, supranote 71, at 241.
74. Scholl, supra note 71, at 813-14.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994),supra note 66.
76. Richmond Homes Mgmt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 1525 (W.D. Va. 1994),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995); see infra text
accompanying notes 134-39.
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comparison to the author's creative investment." The cost of a "copy" of
an architectural design, by contrast, greatly exceeds the architect's own
investment. This greater cost is indicative of the many interests directly
affected by architectural design, including those of developers, building
owners, builders, consultants, governmental bodies, building users, and
the non-user public.78 The copyright model does not adequately account
for these interests.
A.

ArchitecturalDesign Is a ProfessionalService

The American Institute of Architects has argued since its founding in
1857 that architects sell a service, not a product.79 Architectural design,
broadly construed, consists of all of the services provided by architects as
professionals." These services are provided, most directly, to developers.
While a developer generally brings to a project's design process
programmatic requirements," a site,82 a budget, 3 and (indirectly) a
construction technology,84 the architect contributes in varying degrees to
defining or selecting these elements. In fact, many architects would
consider such involvement to be an integral part of an effective design

77. Compare architectural works to other protected subject matter. literary works, musical works,
dramatic works, choreography, pictorial and graphic works, sculpture, motion pictures, and sound
recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
78. In this Comment, "developer" is used to refer to the person or entity which is responsible for
creating the architectural project and which owns the building upon its creation. "Building owner"
refers to the person or entity which owns the project during its useful life. An architect generally will
hire consultants to do the structural, mechanical, and electrical design. Other consultants often
include civil engineers, landscape architects, interior designers, food service consultants, and graphic
designers. For a description of the participants in the construction process, see Justin Sweet, Legal
Aspects ofArchitecture,Engineeringand the ConstructionProcess §§ 8.02-.03 (5th ed. 1994).
79. See Dale Ellickson, Architects' Most Frequent Questions About Copyrights, Architecture,
Apr. 1988, at 132, 132.
80. In this Comment, the term "profession" is used in its narrower sociological meaning: an
organized body of experts who apply esoteric knowledge to particular cases; who have formal entry
prerequisites, including elaborate systems of instruction and training; and who possess and enforce a
code of ethics. See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions:An Essay on the Division of Expert
Labor 4 (1988).
81. The program describes the activities to be housed, the particular requirements of each activity,
and the developer's other project goals. See Alexander, supranote 1, at 84.
82. See Sweet, supra note 78, § 8.07.
83. See id. § 12.02.
84. Available construction technologies are determined by the date the developer chooses to
create the project, the location of the project, and the project's budget.
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process." The elements are interdependent; none can be satisfactorily
considered in isolation.
The architect's central task, however, is to find a coherent physical
form that accommodates all of the developer's requirerrents." Toward
this end, the architect manipulates the variables, such as how a particular
site might be most effectively utilized or how various programmatic
activities might be spatially related. This manipulation continues while
the architect applies alternative concepts of physical form until an
effective match is found. Within this context, the fact that an existing
physical form is selected as the architectural solution is generally
insignificant. Unless the developer's programmatic goals include
uniqueness of design, the use (to any degree) of a previously existing
design that satisfies the project requirements is a successful solution, and
the architect has rendered a valuable professional service to the
developer.
In addition to providing purely architectural services, the architect
generally retains one or more consultants who provide services in related
design specialties." In copyright terminology, consultants are typically
"independent contractors," with their own rights to Ihe work they
produce. 8 Because the "author" of a copyrightable architectural work
need not be a state-licensed architect,89 a consultant's contributions to a
design also may create rights in the undivided work as ajoint author.9"
Under the AWCPA, building owners have no rights in the design of
their own buildings unless the architect has assigned the copyright to
them. 9 The House hearing addressed the fear that any restrictions on
building owners' rights to alter their physical property would severely
disrupt the architect-developer relationship. 92 As a resalt, exceptions
were included in the AWCPA to allow building owners to alter or
demolish their buildings without the copyright owner's consent. 93 The
85. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 84 (describing the program as the "analytical phase" of the
design process).
86. See id. at 15-16, 84 (describing this derivation of form as the "synthetic phase").
87. See supranote 78.
88. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-52 (1989)
(interpreting "work made for hire" as used in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994)).
89. 1990 H.R. Rep., supra note 58, at 18 n.36, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6949 n.36.
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
92. See AWCPA Hearing, supra note 45, at 16-17 (noting that many types of building uses
require growth and change).
93. One section of the AWCPA provides:
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need for such exceptions betrays the poor fit between the traditional
copyright model and the real-world relationships in the architectural
design process.
Legal commentators frequently have argued that copyright for
architectural design is necessary to encourage creativity." This assertion
is unsupported by credible evidence and is contradicted by the
internationally prominent role that the United States has played in
architectural innovation for more than 100 years.95 Architectural
creativity results from a variety of factors other than the promise of
copyright protection, including the demands of particular projects.96 But
even if copyright actually facilitated creativity, that result alone should
not be the ultimate legislative goal. Instead, the aim should be to provide
the best possible design solutions to developers and therefore to society.
By placing restrictions on what designs architects can utilize, architects'
duties are made more difficult to perform.9 7 The best solutions may not
be utilized.
Justification for copyright in architectural design also may confuse
protection of the rights of the architect, as author, with protection of the
rights of other parties involved in the design process.9" Often,
justification relies on the interest of developers or building owners in
creating or owning identifiably unique structures. Building owners have
other forms of protection, however, where similarity of design has been

ALTERATIONS TO AND DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS.-Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 106(2), the owners of a building embodying an architectural work may,
without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the architectural work, make or
authorize the making of alterations to such building, and destroy or authorize the destruction of
such building.
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 704(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (1994)).
94. See, e.g., Shipley, supra note 7, at 395-96; Elizabeth A. Brainard, Note, Innovation and
Imitation: Artistic Advance and the Legal Protection of Architectural Works, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 81,
81(1984).
95. See Sir Banister Fletcher, A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method 1127-28
(17th ed., rev. by ILA. Cordingley, 1967).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86. See also Bucher, supra note 7, at 1267-71
(arguing that copyright would add little incentive to architectural creativity).
97. See AWCPA Hearing, supra note 45, at 114 (statement of David A. Daileda, former AIA
director).
98. The Scarsdale "copycat house" case, Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), in which a residential developer claimed injury from the construction of a house of a design
similar to the developer's, has been incorrectly credited with supplying the impetus for enactment of
the AWCPA. See, e.g., Dale Ellickson, Copyrighting Architecture, Architecture, Dec. 1991, at 95,
95. The architect in that case was not a party to the suit, however, having assigned his rights to the
developer. Demetriades, 680 F. Supp. at 660.
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recognized to be detrimental.99 The control of design to confer benefits
directly on parties other than the architect is inconsistent with the
copyright law model."tu
Architects may have a theoretical interest in being able to protect
original designs from copying, but their rewards depend on, and come
only secondhand through, developers who may be able to exploit the
originality. Whether architects can effectively reap those rewards under
the AWCPA is questioned in part IM1."'1
B.

ArchitecturalDesign Is Partof the PublicEnvironment

The public is free to choose whether and when to enjoy most types of
creative works which are controlled by copyright. Architecture, by
contrast, is largely a public art which indiscriminately imposes itself on
its surroundings and the public once it has been constructed. Not
surprisingly, more than one body of law has evolved to regulate this
environmental aspect of architectural works.
As urbanization has increased, legal restrictions which affect
architectural design, such as zoning, have become more pervasive.0 z
Typically these restrictions are locally crafted to respond to community
desires. 3 They emphasize community over individuality. They also
attempt to ensure that a design is appropriate for its site, to the mutual
benefit of the developer and the public. These regulations tend to
encourage similarity of design within neighborhoods.
Copyright law, by contrast, values originality and distinctiveness
above all other qualities."° It provides no other impetus toward aesthetic
merit or other qualities which contribute to a positive human
environment. Copyright applied to architectural design discourages these
other qualities because it ignores them at the same time that it rewards
99. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at 63-69 (describing federal protection under
design patents and the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994), and state protection under
trademark, trade dress, contract, tortious interference with contractual relation;, conversion, unjust
enrichment misappropriation, and unfair competition). While these protectiom. may be insufficient
to satisfy developers' or building owners' interests, it does not follow that :opyright lav is the
appropriate mechanism to protect those interests.
100. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994) (vesting copyright in the author).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65.
102. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
103. Id. at 388.
104. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (requiring only that works of authorship in the listed
categories be fixed in a tangible medium of expression and be "original"); § 106 (granting copyright
owner the exclusive rights in "derivative works," thereby discouraging similarity).
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distinctiveness. Copyright law does not have the same pernicious effect
on other subject matter because no other subject matter has a public
nature that approaches that of architectural design.
Much of our culture's most cherished architectural heritage is the
result of copying. For instance, many of our state capitols are selfconsciously derived from the U.S. Capitol.'0 5 Consider, as well, the
single-steepled New England church form which has been repeated
innumerable times.0 6 These examples are all in the public domain and
therefore unprotected by copyright because they were constructed prior
to Dec. 1, 1990. The effect of the AWCPA, however, is to discourage
any similar culture-building in the future.
Architectural design at its best results from careful attention to the
unique nature of individual sites and the communities in which they are
located. Architects speak in poetic terms about buildings that grow out of
their site." 7 Frank Lloyd Wright emphasized that good architectural
design does not exist independent of its site.' The AWCPA, however,
takes no notice of the site-specific nature of architectural design. By
making no reference to the relationship of a design to its surroundings, it
creates the false presumption that sites are fungible--that buildings are
commodities that can be arbitrarily located on any site. The AWCPA
places value on an architectural design completely divorced from the
design's context. It therefore creates an inappropriate incentive in the
architectural design process for the copyright owner to reuse designs on
sites for which they were not created.
C.

Architecture Is a Useful Article

Copyright protects the expression of ideas, not the practical use of
ideas. ' 9 This limitation traditionally has barred copyright protection for
works that are merely utilitarian. Although the 1976 Act adopted the
separability test to qualify the design of some otherwise useful articles
for copyright,"0 its application has been unsatisfactory."'
105. Alan Gowans, Styles and Types of North American Architecture: Social Function and
CulturalExpression 85 (1992) (noting that 47 of 50 state capitols emulate U.S. Capitol).
106. See id. at 68-75, 322 (describing evolution of this architectural form through replication).
107. See, e.g., Nathaniel A. Owings, The Spaces in Between: An Architect'sJourney 185 (1973).
108. See, e.g., Frank Lloyd Wright, An Autobiography 192 (1977) ("[No house should ever be on
a hill or on anything. It should be ofthe hill. Belonging to it.").
109. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,214-18 (1954).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
111. 1990 H.R. Rep., supra note 58, at 20, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951.
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No one questions that virtually all architectural works have useful
aspects. The AWCPA raises the issue of which building designs have
expressive features that qualify them as copyrightable "architectural
works.""... This determination is no easier to make in the field of building

design than it is in the design of other types of useful articles such as
mannequins or bicycle racks." 3 This difficulty traditionally had been
recognized, as the Register of Copyrights expressed in a 1961 report:
In the case of architecture particularly, it would often be difficult to
differentiate between the functional and the "artistic" features of a
design. While we are inclined to the view that a limited measure of
protection should be afforded to the designs of functional
structures, we do not believe that the copyright statute provides the
appropriate framework for their protection." 4
Functional elements in architectural design include, at a minimum,
structural members, spatial volumes, circulation, mechanical and
electrical systems, and construction methods." 5 In a very real sense,

function also includes such qualities as building identity, clarity of form,
views, natural light, accessibility, and life safety.
Distinguishing architectural design from unprotectable building design
by the presence of non-functional expressive features is, as has been
suggested elsewhere," 6 merely a restatement of the separability

112. The policies of Berne member countries in distinguishing expression from function in
architectural design may be illuminating. As of 1989, only India, Israel, and Pakistan required by
statute that protectable architecture have an "artistic character or design." See Copyright Office
Report, supra note 2, at 164-93. In 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany expressly abandoned its
requirement of artistic content in architecture. Adolph Dietz, Letterfrom the FederalRepublic of
Germany, 1974 Copyright 86, 88 (World Intellectual Property Organization). Several members list
architecture under the broader heading of "artistic works." See Copyright Office Report, supra note
2, at 164-93. This does not mean, however, that a specific finding of artistic c-ontent is required to
trigger protection. For example, in 1956 England deleted such a requirement for copyrightable
architecture. George Hensher Ltd. v. Restawile Upholstery Ltd., [1974] 2 All E.R. 420, 422-23
(H.L.). Canada deleted the same requirement in 1988. Act of June 8, 1988, ch. 15, § 1(1), 1988-1989
S.C. 279 (amending Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 2 (1985)).
113. See Gary S. Raskin, Comment, Copyright Protectionfor Useful Articles: Can the Design of
an Object Be Conceptually Separatedfrom the Object's Function?, 33 Sania Clara L. Rev. 171
(1993).
114. Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at 93-94 (quoting Repor' of the Register of
Copyrightson the GeneralRevision of the U.S. Copyright Law, H.R. Judiciary Comm., 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961)).
115. See generally James M. Fitch, American Building 2: The Environmental Forces That Shape
It (2d ed. 1972).
116. See Scholl, supranote 71, at 813-14.
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doctrine" 7 and apparently rests on the idea that what is functional is not
expressive. In the middle of the twentieth century, however, a substantial
portion of the architectural profession set about to use the functional
requirements of a building as the words in a new aesthetic language.
What was being expressed-often in an exaggerated way-was function.
This trend can be illustrated by buildings usually described as
"International Style.""' 8 Mies van der Rohe was a prominent architect
whose work embodies that aesthetic." 9 His work also exemplifies the
contradictions inherent in attempting to separate the functional from the
expressive. At the same time, it is cited as an example of fine architecture
worthy of copyright protection, 20 even though it has been the archetype
for much of the modem steel and glass architecture toward which the
public professes considerable dislike. The following description of one of
his buildings shows how expression and function may be misunderstood
outside the architectural profession.
Mies van der Rohe designed Crown Hall, a one-story building which
houses the architecture school at the Illinois Institute of Technology in
Chicago.' 2 ' The most notable features of Crown Hall are four immense
steel girders" which are exposed above the roof and which enable the
entire main floor to be column-free. The casual observer would probably
perceive these girders to be functional, which they are. And there can be
no doubt but that the architect intended just that response.
Although the girders do support the roof, however, closer analysis
reveals that their design is not determined purely by functional
considerations at all. First, from a structural point of view, the girders are
inefficient because they are laterally supported along their length at their
lower edges, not at their upper edges."r Second, locating the girders
outside the insulating "skin" of the building subjects them to temperature
changes which cause significant expansion and contraction. 24 Third,
117. See supra text accompanying notes 14-21.
118. See generally Hitchcock & Johnson, supra note 21.
119. Id. at28.
120. See, e.g., Winick, supranote 71, at 1610 & n.56.
121. Weiner Blaser, Mies van der Rohe 80 (rev. ed. 1972).
122. Id. at 84-85.
123. When a horizontal structural member is under a load, its upper portion is put in compression
and its lower portion is put in tension. Materials in compression tend to deflect to one side to relieve
the stress. Materials in tension do not exhibit the same tendency. A girder whose upper edge is not
supported laterally must be designed larger to withstand this force on its own.
124. In Chicago, the annual temperature range exceeds 100 degrees. The Weather Handbook 133
(McKinley Conway & Linda L. Liston eds., 1990). Steel girders such as these, which are 120 feet
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exposing the girders to view necessitates that they be painted or
otherwise given a finished appearance, requiring both increased initial
cost and increased maintenance over the life of the building.
These girders were designed for an appearance of functionality that
supersedes the reality of their fimctionality. The architect created an
architectural expression that celebrates the functionality of the building's
structure. Whether a lay observer or a court would perceive the aesthetic
expression is doubtful.
Another problem of interpretation may be shown by the Citicorp
Center, completed in 1977 in mid-town Manhattan. 2 Tais office tower
is made distinctive by its sloping top, which appears to be a prime
candidate for a protectable non-functional expressive feature. However
the design originated to enable the installation of solar panels. 6 The
angle of the slope was governed by the angle of the sun at New York
City's latitude. But, because solar panels were ultimately determined to
be impractical, they were never installed. 7 Is the design functional or
expressive?
In fact, architects select forms that solve as rany problems
simultaneously as possible. An elegant solution satisfies both practical
problems and aesthetic problems jointly. Although distinctions may be
made between functional and aesthetic problems in architectural design,
no such distinction is meaningful when considering solutions. And it is
the solutions that copyright law regulates by protecting architectural
works as a subject matter.
III.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING COPYRIGHT LAW
TO ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN

Courts will have difficulty interpreting the AWCPA to define what
works are protectable and to apply the statutory exceptions and
infringement standards. This part discusses these problems from the
architectural profession's point of view.

long, will change in length by a full inch over this temperature range. See American Institute of Steel
Construction, Inc., Manual of Steel Construction:Allowable Stress Design 6-6 (9th ed. 1989). Such
movement must be accommodated by special construction methods.
125. See Mary E. Osman, The 1979 AIA Honor Awards, AIA J., Mid-May 1979, at 164, 172-73.
126. Id. at 172.
127. Id.
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A.

The Scope of ProtectedSubject Matter Is Uncertain

Architects are unable to agree among themselves whether the design
of particular buildings are "architectural works.' 12 ' The AWCPA
nevertheless requires courts to make this determination. Faced with this
task, courts must decide whether artistic content is a requirement. Rep.
Kastenmeier expressly intended that only works with an artistic quality
be protected, 29 and the House Report also suggests, but does not
specifically state, this view. 3
Judicial inquiry into artistic content is undependable at best. The
House Report offers only that "[t]he extent of protection is to be made on
an ad hoc basis."'' Nevertheless, architects must rely on judicial
interpretation of the AWCPA both for protection and to avoid
infringement. Their rights and liabilities rest on inherently unpredictable
lay opinions of their professional work.
Moreover, one should expect infringement cases to be contested on
the fringes of architecture, rather than where architectural qualities are
obvious. In its 1989 report on architectural copyright, the Copyright
Office was unable to cite a single U.S. case where infringement of
copyright had been claimed in what the Copyright Office considered
"fine architecture."'3 While justification for architectural copyright
usually is given by resorting to the most conspicuous examples of design
by well-known architects, 33 the most common infringement suits instead
are likely to involve designs for buildings such as tract houses, strip
shopping centers, and storage sheds.
Courts faced with categorizing these works have been given so much
latitude by the AWCPA's language that any prediction on the result in
most cases can be nothing more than speculation. Courts may, in fact,
completely avoid the task of distinguishing "architecture" from "mere
buildings." They may read the statutory definition of "architectural

128. See Geoffrey Broadbent, Design in Architecture x-xi (1973); Hitchcock & Johnson, supra
note 21, at 78-SO.
129. See 136 Cong. Rec. 1733 (1990) (statement ofRep. Kastenmeier).
130. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
131. 1990 H.R. Rep., supra note 58, at 21, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6952.
132. Copyright Office Report, supra note 2, at 14. Most infringement suits historically have
involved single-family housing. Id. at 12.
133. See, e.g., 136 Cong. Rec. 1733 (1990) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier citing, among others,
Jrn Utzon's Sydney Opera House and Eero Saarinen's terminals at JFK Airport and Dulles Airport).
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work" literally and require
no artistic content at all as a prerequisite to
34
protection.
copyright
In the first reported case to apply the AWCPA to architectural design,
the court made this expansive interpretation.' 35 In Richmond Homes
Management, Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., the court awarded damages for
infringement of the copyright in both the drawings and the design of tract
housing.'36 The court applied the same minimum constittitional standard
of originality to the design that it applied to the drawings: independent
creation and a 'minimal degree of creativity."" 37 The court explained
that "protection extends to the most.mundane, functional products of
modem commercial architecture so long as the minimal originality
requirement of copyright law is met."' 38 The court made no mention of
the AWCPA's legislative history and its higher standard.'39
The Richmond Homes opinion goes beyond what the drafters of the
AWCPA had envisioned. It is, nevertheless, a reasonable interpretation
of the plain language of the statute and is consistent with the
interpretation of other categories of protected subject matter. The opinion
is also consistent with the AWCPA's purpose of complying with the
Berne Convention. Because the Berne member countries
overwhelmingly do not require artistic content, 4 ' it could be argued that
it is appropriate to interpret U.S. law similarly. In addition, the approach
of Richmond Homes avoids a court becoming entangled in the distinction
between architecture and a mere building. Under Richmond Homes, the
only statutory interpretation that remains regarding scope of the subject
matter is whether the work is the design of a "building." This issue is
easier to resolve than the architecture/building distinction; 4' at least
architects may feel greater confidence in knowing whether their work
will be classified as a "building."

134. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), supra note 66.
135. Richmond Homes Mgrnt., Inc. v. Raintree, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1517, 15.25 (W.D. Va.1994),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 66 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 1995). "ee also J.R. Lazaro
Builders, Inc. v. R.E. Ripberger Builders, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 336, 339 (S.D. Inc, 1995) (interpreting
"architectural work" similarly, but without analysis).
136. 862 F. Supp. at 1530.
137. Id. at 1523 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345
(1991)).
138. Id. at 1525.
139. See supranotes 57-58, 129-30 and accompanying text.
140. See supranote 112.
141. See Scholl, supranote 71, at 815-16.
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These factors will likely result in similar holdings in the future.
Therefore, depending on the breadth of future judicial interpretation,
architects should be advised that copying of any original, post-1990
building design may be actionable, irrespective of its architectural
quality. At the same time, because other courts may not follow the
Richmond Homes approach, architects should not rely on protection for
their own utilitarian designs. Congress should reduce architects' risk of
liability for infringement by amending the AWCPA to exclude from
protection designs without artistic or aesthetic expression. Until that
happens, courts should follow the AWCPA's legislative history to reach
the same result.
B.

StatutoryExceptions Add FurtherUncertainty to the Scope of
Protection

If copyright protection for any subject matter is to be effective, it must
prevent infringement or provide a meaningful remedy when infringement
occurs. The AWCPA makes exceptions to protection of architectural
works, however, because of the poor fit between the traditional copyright
model and the nature of architectural design.
One exception allows "pictorial representations" to be, made and
distributed if the building is publicly visible. 4 2 The statute does not
define "pictorial representation.""' It is unclear whether drawings fall
within this exception and whether publication of drawings of copyrighted
architectural works is therefore an infringement.
All realistic drawings of physical objects can be thought of as a form
of drawing which architects know as a "section."'" A section is a planar
slice through or near the depicted object that shows everything that one
would see from that plane looking in one direction.' 45 Sections can be
taken in either vertical or horizontal planes. A section taken horizontally
through a building (at about four feet above a particular floor level) is a
"floor plan." A horizontal section taken above a building creates a "roof
142. The AWCPA provides:
PICTORIAL REPRESENTATIONS PERMITTED.-The copyright in an architectural work
that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the making, distributing, or public
display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work, if the
building in which the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place.
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 704(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (1994)).
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
144. See Tom Porter, GraphicDesign Techniquesfor ArchitecturalDrawing52-53 (1990).
145. See Frank Ching, ArchitecturalGraphics27,42 (2d ed. 1985).
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plan." A vertical section taken from the outside of a building or other
object is called an "elevation."
Courts faced with an infringement claim for any form of drawing of
an architectural work will need to determine how far the pictorial
representation exception extends. Photographs and "pictures" are
specifically excepted.'4 6 Perspective elevations, which portray depth, also
presumably would be excepted because they are so similar to
photographs. Because there is no relevant distinction between
perspective elevations and "flaf' elevations, which do nct portray depth,
the latter also presumably would be excepted. Will a court distinguish
between exterior elevations and interior elevations or sections? One also
could argue that a roof plan fits within the pictorial. representation
exception as well as an exterior elevation does. If that is so, will a court
distinguish between roof plans and floor plans? How these questions are
answered could depend on whether the interior of the building is publicly
accessible, even though the copyright owner may have no control over
that access. These uncertainties make it impossible to know whether the
AWCPA provides protection against publication of drawings of
copyrighted architectural designs.
The AWCPA also grants to building owners the right to alter or
destroy their buildings without the consent of either the "author" or the
copyright owner. 4 7 What is unclear, though, is the extent to which this
exception will conflict with the copyright in the design and drawings.
Does a building owner's right of alteration include the: right to make
drawings of the existing building (either from existing plans or from the
building itself) that otherwise would infringe on the copyright? Perhaps
courts will conclude that building ownership automatically creates an
implied license to make such drawings. But does a building owner's right
of alteration include the right to build an addition that copies the design
of the original?' 4 8
C.

UncertainInfringement StandardsCreate Unknown Liabilityfor
Architects and Building Owners

Whether an addition that copies the design of the original building
would infringe on the copyright in that design may be less clear than it
first appears. Consider an office tower designed by art architect who
146. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(a), supranote 142.
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 120(b), supranotes 92-93 and accompanying text.
148. See Meikle v. Mafe, [1941] 3 All E.R 144 (Ch.) (finding infringement of architect's
copyright when building owner constructed addition that repeated original design).
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retains the copyright in the design and drawings. If the building's owner
decides to double its size by constructing a matching attached addition
and hires another architect for the project, intuition suggests that this
activity falls within the alteration exception. On the other hand, if the
same owner decides to construct an identical separate building on the
same site, that project would clearly be a copyright infringement. The
mere fact that the new construction is or is not attached to the original
building does not provide sufficient justification for this result.
Consider the result if the original building were an office tower built
over a parking garage, where the parking structure had a greater floor
area than the tower and was designed to support additional office space
to be constructed in the future. If the two office towers themselves are
separated, are they still part of the same building? Perhaps the result
depends on whether they share a mechanical system or electrical system.
If so, an architect's rights might hinge on decidedly non-architectural
considerations.
The AWCPA makes architects the most likely infringers of copyright
in architectural works. An architectural education includes the
observation and analysis of thousands of building designs. This
information gathering is essential to build a mental library of forms and
images with which to solve design problems.'49 This learning process
continues throughout an architect's career. As a result, architects may not
know the sources of their design ideas; they are focused instead on a
successful and aesthetic solution to the problem at hand.
Infringement is not excused if the copying is unconscious, however. 5
Because the AWCPA protects individual elements of design, 5' architects
are now subject to liability for copyright infringement if they do not
prevent their memories of other architects' designs from reappearing in
their own work. Judge Learned Hand's warning now applies to
architects: "With so many sources before them they might quite honestly
forget what they took; nobody knows the origin of his inventions;
memory and fancy merge even in adults. Yet unconscious plagiarism is
actionable quite as much as deliberate.,' 52

149. See supra text accompanying note 86.
150. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 & n.12 (2d Cir. 1983)
(holding that copier's intention does not affect liability for infringement).
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), supra note 66 (defining "architectural work" to include
"elements in the design" and excluding only "individual standardfeatures") (emphasis added).
152. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
669 (1936).
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Both the public nature of buildings and the widespread publication of
architectural designs create a great degree of access by potential
infringers. Because a plaintiff may therefore more easily prove access
circumstantially, the degree of similarity needed to establish that copying
took place is lessened.'53 Architectural design always has developed
through borrowing. Now a very modest degree of borrowing may
constitute actionable infringement.
D. Architects Must Protect Themselves by Altering Their,Relationships
with Employees, Consultants,and Developers
1.

Architect-Employee Relationships

Architects generally own the copyright to their employees' work.'54 At
the same time, architects are liable for copyright infringement by their
employees. 5 5 Employees must be informed of the restrictions that the
AWCPA places on the sources for their design work, and architectural
firms should institute procedures to monitor the work produced for
improper borrowing. For instance, a firm might require its designers to
list the known sources of the design ideas used in each project, and the
firm could then make independent in-house reviews for infiingement.
2.

Architect-ConsultantRelationships

An architect's consultants own the copyright in drawings and designs
they produce unless assigned to another party.'56 The AWCPA may, in
addition, vest in a consultant an interest in the copyright in an entire
architectural work as a joint author.'57 Architects should therefore be

153. See Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding thai evidence of access
reduces degree of similarity that must be shown to support finding that copying took place).
154. The copyright statute provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was
prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parttes have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the right,; comprised in the
copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). A "work made for hire" is "a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment." § 101.
155. See Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 262 (D.
Neb. 1982).
156. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994); supranotes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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advised to obtain any such rights their consultants may have.
Architects should also take steps to ensure that their consultants do not
contribute infringing work. For instance, a firm might require its
consultants to follow the same procedures that the firm uses with its own
employees.

3.

Architect-DeveloperRelationships

While the alteration exception partially avoids one architect-developer
conflict created by copyright in architectural design,"5 9 developers will
want to insulate themselves from other liability created by the
AWCPA 60 Because architects are the persons who would typically
produce a copyright infringement and can best prevent it from occurring,
developers will want indemnification from their architects.'
An
architect could, conversely, seek indemnification from a developer, but
the developer has no incentive to assume a risk which is primarily under
the architect's control.
Commentators who have urged copyright protection for architectural
design have presumed that architects would derive an economic benefit
from being vested with the copyright. But architects sell their services
primarily based on an hourly valuation of their time.'6 2 Their hourly rates
must be in line with industry norms.'63 Only if architects are able to resell
prior designs without substantial revisions will they be able to profit
from copyright ownership. Within the segment of the construction
industry where repetitive design is typically used, sophisticated
developers and building owners will wisely demand that the copyright be
158. The rights an architect can obtain will be limited, however, by the consultant's unassignable
right of termination. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994) (giving author reversionary right regardless of prior
agreement).
159. See supranotes 92-93, 147-48 and accompanying text.
160. In addition to money damages, a court can order the destruction of an infringing building.
See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1994); 1990 H.R. Rep., supra note 58, at 14, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6945.
161. See Sapers, supranote 71, at 16 (recommending that developers exact a covenant from their
architects warranting that their designs do not infringe a copyright).
162. See American Institute of Architects, AIA Document B141: Standard Form of Agreement
Between Owner and Architect, arts. 10-11 (14th ed. 1987), reprinted in Sweet, supra note 78, at
app. A. Even when the contract describes a stipulated sum or a percentage of construction cost,
architects typically base their fee proposals on a projection of professional staff hours to be
expended.
163. See Thomas Vonier, Washington Report, Progressive Architecture, Oct. 1990, at 23, 23-24
(describing competitive nature of architectural profession and antitrust lawsuits preventing AIA from
attempting to increase fee scales).
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transferred in the architect's contract for services."6 Thus, architects are
not as likely to benefit financially from copyright protection of their
designs as is assumed by supporters of the AWCPA.
Although their work may be aesthetically pleasing, architects
primarily provide a service, rather than create art.'65 Developers in the
market for a professional service usually can choose among alternative
suppliers. Only in rare instances can an architect demand a fee that is
beyond the normal range of hourly rates, even if the contemplated design
is intended for repetitive use. Architects will therefore receive few
financial benefits from their newly gained copyright protection.
Architects will, however, bear the brunt of successful infringement
claims and spend time and money defending against unsuccessful claims.
As with other forms of liability, a portion may be paid through insurance.
All of the costs nevertheless are paid out of the collective revenues of the
architectural profession.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990 extended
copyright protection to architectural design. Congress acted in response
to U.S. obligations under the Berne Convention, not in response to
requests of the architectural profession. The AWCPA inappropriately
applies traditional copyright doctrine to architectural design and, in
doing so, disregards architectural design's unique character as a
professional service and as a part of our public environment.
The narrow goals of copyright law conflict with the established
practices and laws governing these aspects of architecture. The
architecture-specific exceptions included in the AWCPA are insufficient
to fully ameliorate these conflicts. Because of the overriding importance
of adhering to Berne standards in order to secure international copyright
protection for other subject matter, however, repeal of the AWCPA is
unrealistic. The AWCPA thus creates a new source of liability for
architects, who are the most likely infringers. Therefore, architects
should alter their relationships with developers, consultants, and
employees in order to protect themselves.
Furthermore, courts likely will interpret the scope of protected
architectural works to include all building design, even though Congress

164. See Peter Blackman, Building Pitfall: Copyright Law Liability Lurks for Developers, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 5, 1995, at 5, 10.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 79-86.
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expressed its desire to distinguish between architecture and mere
buildings. Because the broader interpretation will increase the extent of
architects' liability, the architectural profession would be better served
by revising the statutory definition of "architectural works" to exclude
designs without artistic or aesthetic expression. While determining the
presence of such expression in a given design is unavoidably imperfect, a
limitation on the scope of protected subject matter would decrease
architects' liability under the AWCPA.

